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ABSTRACT
The nature, scope and diversity of Canada's largest
real estate development companies were evaluated. Ten
specific development companies were identified and
profiled. Particular emphasis was placed on how these
Canadian development companies have amassed such
considerable real estate investments in the United States.
Specifically, differences between the two nations' real
estate markets, reasons for considerable Canadian
investment in U.S. real estate, and the success of various
investment strategies were identified and evaluated.
It was found that Canadian investment in U.S. real
estate has been considerable over the past twenty years and
is projected to continue to grow in the future. In
addition to reasons why international capital has been
attracted to the U.S. real estate market, Canadian
developers had strong experience with operating regional
offices from a distance, a national bankina system which
was prepared to advance funds on the basis of corporate
credit, and excellent experience in dealina with heavily
regulated domestic real estate markets. A number of
potential U.S. investment strategies for Canadian companies
to pursue were evaluated and recommended for specific types
of Canadian real estate development companies and real
estate products.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Canadians have been investing in United States assets
for years. Starting in the early 1970s, particular
emphasis on investment in U.S. real estate began. Since
its inception, Canada has played an increasing role in the
U.S. real estate market.
This research was a result of the author's desire to
investigate the nature and extent of Canadian investment in
U.S. real estate and particularly the manner in which it
has been made. The neighboring U.S. market represents a
tremendous opportunity for Canadian development
oraanizations, many of which have both succeeded and failed
in their U.S. endeavors.
This research is broken down into six chapters. This
chapter will briefly summarize the conclusions extracted
from this experience. Chapters II and III will provide a
detailed overview of foreign investment in the United
States and the Canadian real estate development industry
respectively. In Chapter IV, ten of the laraest
development companies in Canada will be profiled,
emphasizing their respective ownership and the scope of
U.S. activity. Chapter V evaluates in detail the
strategies utilized by these Canadian firms in makina U.S.
real estate investments. Finally, and most importantly,
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Chapter VI presents conclusions drawn by the author based
on this research.
A summary of conclusions reveals:
1. Although laraely unseen, the investment of
Canadian developers in U.S. real estate is
significant. As a nation Canada ranks among the top
five foreign investors in U.S. real estate markets.
Much of its investment activity has been concentrated
in major metropolitan U.S. cities in the form of
office buildings, shopping centers, industrial
facilities, hotels, nursing homes, and residential
product.
2. Canadian developers have been drawn to the U.S.
market for a variety of reasons. Limited crowth
opportunities within their domestic market, a national
banking industry willina to lend based on corporate
credit, and a history of successfully operating
Canadian subsidiary regional offices from a distance
have in part all contributed to considerable U.S.
investment activity.
3. The Canadian development industry is uniquely
distinct from the American industry. Ownership of the
major development companies is concentrated in very
few hands and all companies are fully diversified by
product type and possess national operations.
Furthermore, these companies have had to adapt to the
regionally-driven U.S. market and its business and
ethical morality compared to their Canadian
experience. Canada's real estate assets have not
attracted international demand to the extent U.S.
assets have, and therefore much more rational pricing
levels exist for Canadian assets.
4. As a aroup, Canadian developers are amona the
largest in the world and domestic competition has
forced them to become extremely aaaressive and
creative. The majority of companies have investments
in U.S. real estate ranging from 30%-90% of their
total asset base.
5. Canadian developers are very private and busy
companies which are hesitant to share information
concerning their operations for competitive reasons.
6. Four major investment strategies have been
utilized by Canadian developers to gain access to the
large and diverse U.S. real estate market.
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Specifically, these are internal crowth/ development,
asset acquisition, corporate acguisition, and
partnerships. In order to be successful in the U.S.
utilizing any of these investment strategies, a
Canadian company must match its historic skills and
expertise to the appropriate strategy.
7. Internal arowth/development has been and will
continue to be a successful stratecgy for Canadian
development companies in the U.S. office, industrial,
and residential markets. This strategy has proven to
be ineffective for U.S. shopping center investment.
8. Asset acquisition has also been successful in the
past in capitalizing on unique market opportunities.
Given the huge current and future demand for U.S. real
estate and resultant excessive pricina levels, this
strategy has become of secondary importance.
9. Corporate acquisition and short-term partnership
strategies with U.S. developers have been and will
continue to be the most effective means of entering
the regional, relationship-driven U.S. shopping center
industry.
10. Canadian investment in the U.S. real estate
market must have an opportunistic premise. There is
no such thing as the "perfect deal." It is a very
long-term and difficult process. Those Canadian
companies that master the challenqes will be the
industry leaders of tomorrow.
8
CHAPTER II
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Overview
Throughout the 1980s, world economies and financial
markets have become increasingly integrated. This
integration, in large part, is the result of numerous
technological advances being made in information
processing. In fact, most businessmen currently agree that
world markets, to a significant degree, have become
"globalized." This situation has allowed foreign investors
to invest enormous sums of capital in the United States
economy in both portfolio investments and direct
investments, which include real estate.' The extent of
foreign investment was adequately illustrated by the U.S.
Commerce Department's recent U.S. Direct Investment
analysis for 1988. The department defined direct foreign
investment as "takeovers, new business ventures, and
reinvested earnings." For the first time in history, total
foreign direct investment in the United States surpassed
that by U.S. firms abroad. The resultant analysis is
presented in Table 1.
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All countries
European community
Japan
Canada
Other Europe
Latin America/Cari
OPEC Members
Middle East
Australia/N. Zeala
Table 1
U.S. Direct Investment
1988
(U.S. billion)
In U.S.
by foreign
$328.9
193.9
53.4
27.4
22.5
bbean 17.0
6.2
nd/S. Africa
Other
5.8
5.6
3.2
Outside U.S.
by U.S.
S326.9
126.5
16.9
61.2
25.7
49.3
10.2
4.1
15.2
23.5
The $328.9 billion of direct investment by foreigners
represents a 21% growth compared to 1987 levels.
Furthermore, U.S. direct investment abroad only grew 6% to
$326.9 billion. The precise ranking by country was as
follows:2
1. Britain
2. Japan
3. West Germany
4. Canada
In 1988 alone, foreign investors spent $65 billion on
United States assets versus $40.3 billion in 1987.
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Additionally, the number of large transactions in excess of
$1 billion doubled from 6 to 12 in 1988. The bulk of this
incremental investment came from the British (S21.5
billion), Japanese ($14.2 billion), and the Canadians
($10.4 billion).3
- It is important to understand the reasons for this
large and increasing foreign appetite for U.S. assets.
Paramount to this growth has been the steady improvement in
the United States economy over the past seven years,
fueling higher levels of return available in this country
versus foreign countries. The United States also
represents a very large and diverse market possessing one
of the most unrestricted economies in the world. Both of
these above considerations have assisted in creating a very
liquid world market for U.S. assets, enhancina both
disposition opportunities and the timing of these
dispositions. Additionally, the United States is
characterized by a very stable political structure, highly
skilled labor force, and in most cases a far less onerous
tax system. Finally, given both the $150 billion federal
budget deficit and a $120 billion annual trade deficit, the
U.S. requires' and relies on foreign sources of capital to
finance its economy. 4  Without foreian investment, the
United States economy would be severely crippled. As a
final note, foreign investment in the U.S. has become a
very popular concern recently. Many states have begun
11
lobbying for more stringent review of foreign investment.
As of yet, however, no formal action has been proposed or
taken.
Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate
Included in this foreign preference for United States
assets is a particular emphasis on real estate. Between
1982 and 1986, foreign direct investment in U.S. real
estate has nearly doubled from $11.4 billion to $21.2
billion.5 This trend has continued through 1987 and 1988
and is expected to continue further into the future.
Although, when examined separately, the amount of foreign
real estate investment is staggering, in aggregate
perspective it still represents less than 1% of America's
total real estate.6  This percentage does increase,
however, as the focus narrows to the central business
districts of major cities in the United States. This type
of investment is characteristically the most common form of
foreign investment to date. 7 Table 2 graphically
illustrates the relative positions of international foreign
direct investment in U.S. real estate. In 1982, foreign
investment in real estate was primarily controlled by Latin
America (28.7%), the United Kingdom (18.0%), and Canada
(16.5%).8 By 1986, although the same three parties
controlled the majority of foreign-owned U.S. real estate,
an extremely aggressive investor had emerged. This nation
was Japan. During this five-year period, Japan increased
12
Table 2
Total Foreign Direct
in U.S. Re
by Countryof F
1982 v
1982 FDI POSITION IN U.S. REAL ESTATE
$11.4 BLUON
Latin America
(28.7%)
33000005
Switzerland 0000000000o
(2.6%) 0000
Other
e8.8%)United
Kingdom
(18.0%)
Japan
(3.5%)
Netherands
(15.3%)
Canada
(16.5%)
Investment Position
al Estate
oreign _ Investor
s. 1986
1986 FDI POSITION IN U.S. REAL ESTATE
$21.2 BLLION
Switzerland
(2.1%) ,
Latin America
- (21.3%)
United
Kingdom
(23.8%) Other(8.5%)
Canada
(15.0%)
Japan
(11.4%)
Netherlanc
(12.5%)
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its ownership position, relative to the rest of the world,
from 3.5% to 11.4%.9 The only other foreign nation to
increase its relative share was the United Kingdom, fueled
by British investors. By 1989, Japan had surpassed Canada
and was second only to Britain in terms of U.S. real estate
investment activity.
Foreign investment has grown considerably over the
past decade. Foreign investment in real estate has
remained at approximately 10% of total direct foreign
investment. There are a number of key reasons for this
retained share. Some reasons are similar to those of
American investors, such as portfolio diversification,
attractive rates of return generated through property value
appreciation, tax savings via depreciation, and a growing
income stream adjustable upwards by increasing rents.
Other reasons are unigue to the foreign investors
themselves. As discussed, many foreign countries do not
possess economies and governments which are as conducive to
real estate investment as in America. Many of these
countries have experienced very high levels of inflation
and their investments in financial assets have experienced
poor performance levels. As opposed to financial assets,
real estate offers an excellent hedge against inflation.
Another fundamental reason is the fact that the U.S. dollar
has declined substantially in relation to many world
currencies. This has caused the price of dollar
14
denominated assets to appear very low, particularly real
estate. This issue is magnified when applying it to Japan.
Not only has the U.S. dollar fallen significantly in
relation to the Japanese yen, but in Japan land is such a
scarce commodity that similar product, when it trades--
which is rare--commands prices forty to fifty times
greater. Thus, quality real estate investment
opportunities in Japan are very hard to come by. This
scarcity of guality product has also occurred in a number
of other nations as well. By virtue of its large size and
depth, the U.S. real estate market also offers an
opportunity for foreigners to learn new development and
financing techniques, aenerate attractive returns, and add
to their stock of human capital. Finally, even though the
1986 tax code severely undermined the U.S. real estate
industry, the U.S. code still offers many foreigners
advantages compared to the treatment similar assets receive
at home.10
When analyzing foreign investment in U.S. real estate,
Japan in particular seems to stir the American public's
emotions since it is so visibly active, rich, and powerful.
During the past six years the Japanese have been akin to
the "new kid on the block." Unlike the Japanese, both the
British and the Canadians have been buying America's real
estate for years. Canadians have never received the kind
of attention the Japanese have received, despite the
15
country's sianificant direct real estate investment
position in the United States.
Based upon this introductory review of foreian
investment in the U.S., and specifically direct foreign
real estate investment, the remainder of this research will
focus on Canadian direct investment in the United States
real estate market.
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CHAPTER III
CANADIAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY
Overview
Canada's population is approximately one-tenth the
size of America's population base. In fact, the entire
Canadian population approximates that of the state of
California. Additionally, most of its population is spread
out along the U.S. border. Both of these factors have
important ramifications pertaining to the Canadian real
estate industry. These factors have resulted in many
companies developing a national presence of operations as
well as venturing south to the larger U.S. marketplace to
facilitate growth.
The Canadian Institute of Public Real Estate Companies
(CIPREC) includes a broad membership of industry
participants and currently estimates the total asset base
of its members to be $65 billion.' Its membership
specifically includes most of Canada's large real estate
investment and development companies, real estate
subsidiary companies of public companies, large privately
owned real estate development companies, trust companies,
life insurance companies, and banks. In addition to these
participants, large pension funds, construction companies,
foreign investors, and individual investors play an active
and significant role in the industry.
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This research has been intentionally defined to
examine the U.S. investment practices of the largest
Canadian public and privately owned real estate development
companies. This definition was established for the
following three reasons. First, a fractionalized sample of
the industry was required given the time and scope
restraints of this research effort. Secondly, this sample
represents the most active and substantial participants in
the Canadian industry. Finally, this sample includes the
recognized leaders of the industry and, as a result. some
of the most successful and wealthiest men in the world are
its senior executives.
History
Starting with virtually no money, the top Canadian
developers have within the past forty years planted
the maple leaf throughout Canada. the United States,
and England, and are investigating opportunities in
South America, Europe, and Hong Kong. As a group they
have become one of the world's largest real estate
developers.2
Many of the large development organizations today started
out in the 1950s in the homebuilding business. The
business was rapidly expanding due to the demands of the
post-war baby boom generation. The following table
highlights the men who founded companies that would grow to
become some of the largest development organizations in the
country.3
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Company
Campeau
Bramalea
Daon Dev
Oxford D
Fairvie~w
Cadillac
Carma Li
Olympia
Trizec C
Marathor
Markbor
Table 3
Founders of Canadian Real Estate Companies
Founder
Corporation Robert Campeau
Limited Tom Spriggs
Magnus Paulson
Donald Kerr
elopments Graham Dawson
Jack Poole
evelopment Donald Love
Corporation Charles Bronfman
Leo Kolber
Development Allen Diamond
Joseph Berman
Jack Kamin
mited Roy Wilson
Albert Bennett
Howard Ross
and York Development Albert Reichman
Paul Reichman
orporation William Zeckendorf
Eagle Star Insurance
Realty Company Canadian Pacific
)ugh Properties Inc. Brian Magee
E.P. Taylor
20
All of these men were bright, aggressive and energetic
entrepreneurs. In terms of representing this generation's
zeal, William Zeckendorf stands above the rest. "There
probably has never been anybody as colorful, as daring, as
outrageous, as innovative, or as controversial on the North
American real estate scene as the high-living, hard-driving
Zeckendorf. "4
All of these firms undertook extremely aggressive
diversification programs to facilitate growth. This was
diversification in terms of both product and geographic
location. These companies, for the most part, represent
the backbone of the Canadian real estate development
industry in 1989. Each company has expanded its asset base
to well in excess of one billion dollars through
significant investment, primarily in Canada and the United
States. Furthermore, a number of the companies have
ventured into new industries, primarily natural resource
based, to assist in diversifying the cyclical risk of their
corporations' cash flows. Specific examples of this form
of diversification include Olympia and York's purchases of
interests in Brinco Ltd., Bow Valley Industries Ltd.,
Noranda Mines Ltd., and MacMillan Bloedel Ltd.5
Throughout the sixties and particularly the seventies,
it appeared that all the Canadian development companies
were making substantial gains in net worth as a result of
their ambitious investing. A considerable amount of this
21
investment was in the U.S. Throughout this period very
little strategic planning was conducted. The developers as
a group were still extremely entrepreneurial in nature.
All of the companies possessed very high debt-to-equity
ratios and very few financial controls were utilized. "The
companies were having the times of their lives, and the
banks were backing them up 100% of the way since the
bankers were very interested in growth as well."6 However,
all of the land and construction loans were outstanding in
the form of variable rate debt which eventually resulted in
severe problems for the industry in the early 1980's when
interest rates rose to greater than 20%.
Many of the firms had acquired substantial land
positions as opposed to quality income generating assets.
"A number of smaller developers went broke while larger
companies were forced to restructure, sell assets, or be
bought out." 7 There are a number of good examples of this
type of industry consolidation. At the top of the list is
Oxford Developments. In the late seventies, the company
was primarily fin.anced by three institutions. These were
-Great West Life, Confederation Life, and Canada Trust.
"Based upon its substantial expansion and acquisition
program, Oxford was probably leveraged to the greatest
extent of any of the large Canadian real estate
companies."8 The three institutions repeatedly expressed
concern, to Oxford's principals, over the company's
22
financial exposure. Concerned about its investors'
potential withdrawal, Oxford's chairman made a $26 ner
share offer for the company and took it private. In order
to finance the buyout, Oxford was forced to sell assets.
Specifically it sold its respected shopping center division
to Great West Life (70%) and former Oxford Shopping Center
executives Lorne Braithwaite and Donald Priddle (30%).
These executives subsequently sold 20% of the 30% to a
group of Canadian institutions. This transaction was the
base of operations for what is now known as Cambridge
Shopping Centers Ltd. 9
Another significant example of industry consolidation
in the early eighties was the purchase by Bell Canada
Enterprises of substantially all of Daon's real estate
holdings. The resultant company born out of this
transacation would be Bell Canada Enterprises Development
Coprooration (BCED). The cause once again was related to
Daon's extremely aggressive investment program prior to the
adverse changes in the North American economy.
Additionally, BCED followed up in 1985 with a U.S. $1.1
billion purchase of Oxford Development's United States
income property portfolio.10
It is important to emphasize that although the above
transactions illustrate the industry's reaction to the last
recession, many develooment companies both large and small
experienced similar severe problems.
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One firal consolidation worthy of record, unrelated to
adverse market conditions, was the merger of the two
companies Cadillac and Fairview in 1974. At the time,
Cadillac was primarily a home-builder while Fairview was a
commercial developer. It was felt that the merger of the
two companies would create a solid company with combined
assets and management capable of taking on very large-scale
projects. The merger was guite successful and indeed the
company went on to develop large-scale projects throughout
North America under the name Cadillac Fairview
Corporation.'"
Table 4 highlights the major Canadian development
companies and their respective current financial positions.
The companies have been ranked according to total asset
size. Two of these companies are private comoanies.
Olympia and York Developments.has been private since its
incorporation. Cadillac Fairview recently became
privatized following the sale of virtually all of its U.S.
assets in 1987 to JMB Realty and a syndicate of
institutions led by Copley Real Estate Advisors.12
Finally, Marathon Realty is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Canadian Pacific and Markborough Prooerties, is controlled
by the Hudson Bay Company.
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Table 4
Major Canadian Development Companies
(S Canadian millions)
Company Year Assets Debt Equity Cash Flow
Olympia & York* 1988 SNA $NA SNA SNA
Campeau** 1988 14295 13008 88 146
Trizec 1988 8618 6500 1312 275
Bramalea 1988 3765 2653 887 108
Cadillac Fairview* 1987 3393 1804 258 45
BCE Devt. 1987 3069 1927 685 17
Marathon*** 1987 2033 1517 443 76
Cambridge 1988 1626 1093 510 43
Markborough**** 1988 1481 1118 293 15
Coscan 1987 772 501 102 16
Tridel 1987 665 373 143 39
Carena 1987 655 176 472 31
Oxford 1987 650 156 146 (843)
Hammerson 1987 594 68 410 33
JDS 1988 342 109 221 7
Royal Lepage 1987 328 147 85 36
HCI 1987 315 160 105 34
Atlantic Centers 1988 289 186 90 11
Ivanhoe 1987 278 190 74 39
Four Seasons 1987 196 82 69 24
Carma 1987 101 48 49 (4)
Melcor 1987 171 117 26 6
Revenue Prop. 1987 84 64 14 5
General Leasing 1987 81 51 18 2
Journey's End 1987 76 27 36 8
Viceroy 1988 27 5 20 7
* Private company
** $US currency presentation
* Wholly-owned subsidiary of Canadian Pacific
**** Wholly-owned subsidiary of Hudson Bay Company
Source: Harry Rannala, Canadian Real Estate Industry (Toronto: publisher,
August 1988), p. 9.
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Despite Canada's smaller population and limited
markets, a number of the top Canadian firms are as well
capitalized as the largest developers in the United States.
The main reason for this fact is that many Canadian firms
have aggressively diversified into varied real estate
product in the larger United States market. Of the twenty-
six companies highlighted in Table 5, eighteen, or 75%,
possess considerable real estate investments in the United
States. Furthermore, the top ten companies all have
possessed U.S. real estate investments. with the exception
of Cambridge Shoppina Centres Limited. However, Cambridge
Shopping Centres Limited has been actively pursuing retail
real estate investment opportunities in the United States
for the past two years.1 3 Author Susan Goldberg made the
following observation:
In 1973, the Canadians had virtually no assets in the
United States. By 1982, at least half of their assets
were south of the border. By 1985, 75 percent of the
assets of many of these firms will be in the U.S.
They are not neglecting Canada, but the United States'
larger population and its older cities yield many more-
development opportunities.14
United States Investment Rationale
Developers have an attitude of invincibilitv.
Decision.makers run these companies and if there
isn't anything major to decide on; they create
something. They are always thinking in the
future. -- David King, former President
of Campeau Corporation
Many of these Canadian development companies are still
run either by their founders or by the seasoned executives
who were responsible for building these businesses to their
26
current grand scales. Despite the size to which their
assets have grown, these companies are still guided by a
very small group of individuals. Ego always has and always
will play a very large role in the real estate development
business. The ability to make deals in the tough,
competitive and visible United States real estate market
went a long way towards stroking these egos. The
importance of this force on explaining the Canadian
developers' entrance into the U.S. cannot be overstated.15
Unlike the vast majority of U.S. developers, the
Canadian companies grew very quickly to create a national
presence. Based on the Canadian market's limited size and
population, the national market began to be viewed as "the
market"--particularly when tenants began to take on
geographic diversification. A strong example of this is
the national presence of Canadian department stores. The
important result of this geographic diversification was
that Canadian developers became very effective at operating
the regional offices of their businesses from a distance.
Hence, in relation to U.S. diversification, the question
-simply became, "If we can effectively go East and West, why
not South?"1 6 In addition to geographic diversification by
Canadian developers, the competitive nature and limited
size of the market resulted in the majority of developers
diversifying into new products. The most duplicated
product diversification was from residential into office,
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retail, industrial, and major mixed-use projets. Some of
these developers also entered into retirement lodges,
nursing homes and hotels. This diversification allowed
these companies to develop skill within each market segment
which assisted them greatly in establishing diversified
U.S. portfolios.
With a number of very capable people competing
against one another in a small community, a
Canadian developer had to be good to survive.
This environment produced a survival of the
fittest syndrome. With first class office
buildings across the street from each other,
developers had to try to outdo one another to
draw attention and tenants to their project.
Canada has been a fabulous school where you were
either good or got knocked out.17
Another important explanation for the Canadians'
entrance into the U.S. market was capital. Prior to 1972,
there did not exist distinct capital gains tax treatment
associated with the sale of real estate assets. Instead,
sale proceeds were simply treated as ordinary income and
taxed at ordinary income rates. This provided a
significant disincentive to sell assets. "Based upon the
success of these companies, huge capital bases were built
up."1 8 Furthermore, in order to minimize taxes through
deferral, the companies were forced to continue to grow in
order to generate deductions from new projects under
development to offset taxable earnings of the corporation.
Thus, the companies were constantly looking for new
development opportunities to reinvest this substantial
capital base. "Canada's opportunities were limited by
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quantity and competition and therefore these developers
looked to the larger U.S. marketplace."19
Probably the most critical reason for U.S. investment
was the developers' relationships with the Canadian banking
industry.
Canadian banks provided a huge advantage to
developers desiring to invest in the United
States. Their practice of lending money on
corporate credit as opposed to specific assets
made geographic diversification much easier
relative to U.S. asset lending practices. When
entering a new U.S. market, no new financing
relationships had to be established. The
developers were able to move very quickly on
deals .2 0
The Canadian banking system is quite different from the
U.S. system. As opposed to the thousands of primarily
regional U.S. banks, the Canadian banking network was
national in scope and dominated by five major banking
institutions. These institutions were the Royal Bank of
Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto-
Dominion Bank, Bank of Montre'al, and the Bank of Nova
Scotia. Based upon the Canadian people's propensity to
save, these five institutions were eager to expand their
loan portfolios with successful developers who had built up
solid track records with them.2 1
As alluded -to previously, there existed a fierce
rivalry in Canada among developers for limited
opportunities. This existence pushed their creative
talents to successfully compete in the marketplace.
International reputations began to develop from their
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creative projects which assisted them in winning many
development proposal designations in United States
cities .2 2
In general, much tougher zoning and regulatory red
tape existed in most Canadian cities compared to the cities
of the United States. In terms of U.S. investment. this
factor had two important results. First of all, in U.S.
cities such as Dallas and Houston. where very little
regulation existed, minimal regulation offered Canadians
the opportunity to "get into the ground much guicker,"
thereby eliminating certain approval risks. Secondly, in
U.S. cities where strong building regulations existed, such
as those in California and Massachusetts, the Canadians'
experience was quite valuable in terms of successfully
tackling the politics of development in these cities.
2 3
In the mid-1970s, as Canadian investment in the U.S.
was on the rise, the U.S. real estate market experienced a
severe decline in value. Most notable was New York City,
where the entire city was facing potential bankruptcv.
This economic reality provided many excellent buying
opportunities for the asset-rich Canadian development
industry. With a legal system, customs, and general set of
business practices in the U.S. similar to those in Canada,
the transition to investment south of the border did not
include any significant barriers. As Bernie Ghert, former
President of Cadillac Fairview recalled, "It was not as if
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we were investing in France." Furthermore, convenient
communication and travel to the U.S. market was readily
available.2 4  "In the seventies everyone got into the act.
You saw others doing it and figured they were making money
at it--at the time it was the thing to do." 25
Canadian Industry Outlook
The outlook for the Canadian real estate development
industry is mixed. The continuation of the current
economic cycle following the financial crisis in October
1987 suggests this cycle possesses the fundamentals for
continued growth and longevity. Furthermore, the severe
decline in the value of publicly-listed equity and fixed-
income investments which occurred in October 1987 resulted
in an increased emphasis on real estate investment. Real
estate values held up well during this period of economic
uncertainty, thereby reinforcing the importance of real
estate as an integral component of a balanced investment
portfolio.
The deregulation of the Canadian financial markets to
include schedule B banks and foreign investment dealers
will provide a new source of demand for the industry. This
fact, coupled with the execution of the free-trade
agreement with the United States, should have a positive
impact on both real estate values and Canadian product
acceptability and liquidity in the international
marketplace.26
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In both Canada and the United States, the majority of
markets have become extremely mature. In other words, most
cities have been built-out in relation to demand--if not
overbuilt. This situation will limit the number of large
real estate development projects to be undertaken in the
future. Furthermore, tax reform in both Canada and the
United States has had a moderating effect on the level of
new building commitments.2 7 In the United States, TRA 86
removed a number of tax-driven incentives previously
available to real estate investors. The new act basically
eliminated the U.S. real estate syndication business.
Depreciation schedules were extended, new classifications
of income type were defined, and significant deductions
previously allowable from taxable income were eliminated.
In Canada, real estate tax reform has also been instituted
which should slow the level of future development activity.
"Unlike in the U.S., once the Canadian government starts in
a direction it never stops and usually accelerates its
programs following implementation."28 Specific legislation
impacting future development activity in Canada is as
.follows:
- Financing costs of land held for
development or under development will be
capitalized for tax purposes until the
income earned from the land offsets the
carrying cost, or until the land or project
is sold. Previously, these expenses could
be immediately deducted for tax purposes.
Soft costs associated with development will
be treated in the same manner. This is
being phased in over the next five years.
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- Capital gains tax on the sale of income
property increased from 50% to 66.6% on
June 30, 1988. This will rise to 75% in
1990.
- Capital cost allowances cannot be
deductible until a new building is
considered to be substantially in use.
- Proposed "value added" tax on the sale of
income property real estate and on rental
income received from a building or land
will have a significant impact on
profitability until leases expire and are
rewritten to pass on this additional
cost.29
However, as the eliminations of these real estate tax
advantages are phased in, so too will be the decline in the
overall level of corporate income tax rates. Taken
together, the result is an aparent shift in the risk
structure of real estate investment in North America.
As Harry Rannala, from McClean McCarthy stated,
Without the ability to write off carrying costs,
developers will require a higher level of pre-
leasing before committing to a project. The
project will require a higher equity component to
offset the anticipated working capital. reduction
which the portfolio will experience as it becomes
taxable. The incentive and economic ability of
carrying a land inventory will also be reduced.3 0
Tax reform in both countries should result in a
decline in development activity in the short term. As
markets begin to tighten, and rental rates associated with
real estate product increase, enhanced property values will
improve the risk-reward trade-off, causing a renewed level
of development activity. During this interim period,
developers will search for income property acquisitions to
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allow them to build up tax shelter and provide future
growth. Based upon reasons previously outlined in this
reaserch, Canadian developers will continue to look towards
the United States real estate market to aenerate this
future growth.
Finally, as development activity begins to increase,
many companies may find selling assets to non-tax paying
institutions, such as pension funds or offshore investors.
an attractive alternative versus carrying these investments
in a fully taxable position. One long-time industry
observer oredicted the following result: "The industry in
general will evolve into much more of an institutional
aame."si
Responding to the allure of growth and profit
opportunities in the American real estate market, virtually
all of Canada's largest developers have ventured into the
U.S. market. These developers are profiled in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CANADIAN DEVELOPERS
This research component is designed to provide a brief
profile of each of Canada's largest real estate development
organizations. Additionally, each company's respective
ownership position and existing investments in the United
States real estate market will be identified.
Carena Developments Ltd,
Carena Development's shares trade publicly on both the
Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges under the symbol
"CDN." Although on its own Carena Development's total
assets are $655 million, Carena's corporate investments
represent real estate development companies with total
assets in excess of $9 billion.1 When viewed on this
basis, Carena is one of Canada's largest publicly listed
real estate companies. The company is an investment
holding company as well as a considerable merchant banking
operation. In 1988, fifty-seven percent of its gross
income was sourced from its investments while the remaining
forty-three percent came from its merchant banking
.operation.2 In addition to its indirect interest in major
Canadian developers, it also has direct interests in
numerous real estate development projects including office
buildings, shopping centers, and land developments.
Carena's merchant banking operation includes advising
management on acquisition and finance, arranging financing,
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and equity participation in the deals it becomes involved
with. Partnerships are generally structured with a
personal guarantee from Carena's partner and a first
mortgage charge on the project. Carena receives an equity
interest ranging from 20% to 50% depending on the
associated level of assumed risk. Carena's clients are all
experienced developers with at least five years of
experience and a net worth of at least $10-15 million.
This segment of its business is active in a number of U.S.
markets. These markets are major metropolitan areas in
Minneapolis, New York, Dallas, Washington DC, and Southern
California.
As discussed, Carena maintains a significant
investment in a number of major Canadian developers as
well. Specifically, these companies are Trizec (38%),
Coscan (52%), and Carma (45%). Through its investment in
Trizec, the company benefits from Trizec's corporate
investments in two major U.S. developers. This
relationship will be elaborated on later in this paper.
The ownership of Carena Developments can be traced
back to Hees International and Edper Investments
(Bronfmans). The following table illustrates its
respective ownership position. 3
38
Table 5
Carena Development's Ownership
EDPER INV.1 41% HE NENTOA
49.9% 49.9%
CARENA HOLDINGS
LIMITED
65%
CARENA DEVELOPMENTS -
LIMITED
70%
CARENA PROPERTIES POOLBLACK
HOLDINGS INC. INVESTMENTS:]
50.01%
1
CARENA PROPERTIES 3.3% 52%
INC.
50 .4% 45%
11%-
TRIZEC CORP. CARMA CO SCAN
Olympia and York Developments
Olympia and York Developments is a private company.
As a private company very little is known of their overall
financial position. In a recent Forbes article. the net
worth of the company was estimated to be $8 billion.4  The
company is owned and managed by the Reichman family of
Toronto. which is one of the wealthiest families in the
world. Its business success was founded through real
estate development. Beginning in the fifties, followina
their arrival from Tanqier, they started a tile-importing
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business. This led to the construction of their first
warehouse facility associated with this business. From
then on, Paul and Albert Reichman devoted their careers to
becoming one of the largest real estate developers in the
world. In terms of traditional real estate developers, the
company is an anomaly. From 1965 to 1975 the company built
an impressive Canadian real estate portfolio including
First Canadian Place, the largest building in the
Commonwealth and the tallest bank building in the world (72
stories). In 1977, the company entered the United States
real estate market to buy the "Uris Package" of eight New
York City office buildings for U.S. $320 million. This
transaction was subsequently dubbed the "deal of the
century"5 In 1980, again in New York City, the company was
awarded developer designation to develop the eight million
square foot Battery Park City in Lower Manhattan--"the
largest private commercial development in the world."6
The company's business also includes corporate
investments in a variety of real estate and non-real estate
entities. An extensive account of the interests Olympia
and York holds would be a study in itself. Briefly the
major companies it possesses an interest in are as follows:
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Table 6
Olympia and York Developments
Corporate Investments
Company Industry
Bramalea Limited Real estate
Block Brothers Real estate
English Property Real estate
Trizec Corporation Real estate
Cadillac Fairview* Real estate
Campeau Corporation Retail/real estate
Carena Properties Inc. Real estate
BCE Developments Real estate
Canada Northwest Land Natural resources
Brinco Natural resources
MacMillan Bloedel Natural resources
Noranda Natural resources
Bow Valley Industries Natural resources
Gulf Canada Natural resources
Trilon Financial services
Abitibi-Price Newsprint
Hiram Walker Liquor/beveraqes
* interest divested in 1987.
This by no means represents a complete listinq of the
Reichman's corporate empire. It has simply been provided
to illustrate the vast extent of investment holdings.
particularly within the North American real estate
industry. As a final note, at the time of this research,
the company had recently purchased a 67% controlling
interest in BCED, and is in the midst of tendering the
remaininq 33% of the company's outstanding common stock. 7
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Campeau Corporation
Campeau Corporation is a substantial Canadian public
company whose shares trade on the Toronto, Montreal, and
Nasdaq stock exchanges under the symbol "CMP" (Nasdaq
symbol "CMAFC"). From its humble beginnings as a
homebuilder in Ottawa, Ontario, Campeau Corporation,
through acquisition and development, has become a
distinguished real estate development and retailing company
operating department stores, supermarkets, shopping malls,
and commercial office and mixed-use properties across the
United States and Canada. Its operations encompass more
than sixty-four million square feet and generated 1988
revenues in excess of U.S. $8 billion. Through its 1986
investment in Allied Stores Corporation and 1988
acquisition of Federated Department Stores in the United
States, Campeau is now one of the largest department store
retailers in North America. Combined, these two companies
operate nine divisions in more than 250 locations
throughout the United States. Each division commands a
strong market presence and is a well-established name in
-each of the communities in which it operates. Campeau also
owns Ralph's Grocery Company, a 137-store supermarket
chain with U.S. $2.4 billion in total 1988 sales and a key
market position in Southern California. The foundation of
this company is its quality retail and commercial property
portfolio. This portfolio includes office buildings,
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shopping centers, industrial facilites, and land in both
the Canadian and United States real estate markets. "The
company's real estate strategy is to grow though the
development of new projects and the expansion of existing
properties located in selected, high-growth urban centers
in Canada and the United States."8
Campeau, of all the Canadian developers in 1989, is by
far the most aggressively leveraged company. As a result
of its two recent U.S. acquisitions, the extent of its U.S.
investment is illustrated in Table 7.
Table 7
Can
Campeau Investment Segmentation
1988 (U.S. $ millions)
ada United States Tot
Assets $992 $12,848
Revenue 169 8,499
Operating
Profit 107 774
Source: Campeau 1988 Annual Report
13,
8,
al
840
668
881
The bulk of this high level of U.S. investment is in the
department store business. The geographic location of this
investment in the United States is depicted in Table 8.
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Table 8
Department Store Assets
Department Store
Lazarus
Maas Brothers
Abraham & Strauss
Stern's
Burdines
Jordan Marsh
Rich's/Goldsmith's
Bon Marche
Bloomingdale' s
Location
Ohio, Indiana
Kentucky, West
Virginia, Michigan
Florida, Georgia,
South Carolina
New York,
New Jersey
New York,
New Jersey,
Philadelphia
Florida
New England
Georgia, South
Carolina, Alabama,
Tennessee
Pacific Northwest
National
Square Feet
8,265,000
5,875,000
5,344,000
4,478,000
5,254,000
5,054,000
6,216,000
4 , 581, 000
4, 518 , 000
49, 585 ,000
Source: Campeau Corporation 1988 Annual Report
Campeau's direct interest in U.S. real estate includes
2,653,000 square feet of shopping center space in
Massachusetts, Washington, and New Jersey. Furthermore,
the company owns 746,000 square feet of office product and
719,000 square feet of business park product. The majority
of these two uses are located in the state of California.
9
It is also important to note that under its new wholly-
owned subsidiary, Campeau Development Corporation, the
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company is proceeding with major shopping center projects
in Massachusetts and New York. Additionally, in a joint
venture with the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, the
company intends to develop additional shopping centers and
expand existing centers over the next several years.
The company is 53% owned and managed by its founder
Robert Campeau. The only other major shareholder, outside
of the Campeau family, is Olympia and York Developments,
which currently controls approximately 25% of the company
on a fully-diluted basis.'0
Trizec Corporation.
Trizec Corporation's shares trade publicly on both the
Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges under the symbol
"TZC." In 1976, Trizec was extremely close to bankruptcy--
it could not meet its payroll. Its then controlling owner,
English Property, was also in financial difficulty caused
by the weak English real estate market at the time. The
result was the sale of English Property's controlling
interest in Trizec to Peter and Edward Bronfman (Edper
Investments). The Bronfmans placed Harold Milavsky in
charge of turning the ailing company around, which he has
done very successfully. In 1979, Olympia and York
Developments acquired control of English Property,
providing the company with a substantial interest in Trizec
Corporation. This acquisition was very controversial,
causing bad feelings between two of the most powerful and
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influential Canadian families.' T
Trizec will be outlined later in this section of the
research.
Trizec is Canada's largest income property developer,
with operations geographically diversified throughout North
America. In addition to its own portfolio of office
buildings, shopping centers, retirement lodges, nursing
homes, and hotels, the company also has major equity
interests in a number of Canadian and United States
development companies.12
The principal focus of Trizec's business is to own and
manage commercial income properties for long-term
investment and to expand the portfolio through the
development of new projects, the expansion and
renovation of existing properties, and through
acquisition. The company concentrates on two key
sectors of the North American real estate industry.
First, office and mixed-use properties in downtown
commerical business districts in major metropolitan
centers. Secondly, retail centers in urban and
suburban markets across Canada and the United
States.13
The distribution of the corporation's operations between
Canada and the U.S. is illustrated in Table 9.
Table 9
Trizec Investment Segmentation
1988 (Cdn $ millions)
Canada United States Total
Assets $3,874.5 $3,548.3 $7,422.8
Revenue 626.4 467.0 1,093.4
Operating
Profit 384.5 279.3 663.8
Source: Trizec Corporation 1988 Annual Report
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he current ownership of
Corporate investments made by the company include a
70% interest in Bramalea Limited, a 25% interest in the
U.S.-based Rouse Company of Columbia, Maryland, and a 100%
ownwership of the Hahn Company of San Diego, California.
Bramalea Ltd. is a large diversified developer in Canada
and the U.S., while both Rouse and Hahn are primarily U.S.-
based retail real estate development companies.14
In aggregate, the amount of Trizec's investment in the
U.S. is substantial. Table 10 illustrates the geographic
presence of Trizec Corporation in the United States real
estate market.
Table 10
Trizec Corporation
U.S. Investments
California Washington
Colorado Oregon
Texas Nevada
Georgia Montana
Missouri South Dakota
Connecticut Utah
Michigan New Mexico
Minnesota Iowa
Tennessee South Carolina
North Carolina Virginia
Pennsylvania Maryland
New Jersey Alabama
Florida Illinois
New York Arizona
Source: Trizec Corporation, 1988 Annual Report
It is important to note that in addition to Trizec's
direct investments in the U.S., mentioned above, the
wholly-owned Hahn Company is the fifth largest shopping
center developer in the U.S. and the largest on the West
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Coast. Hahn currently owns and operates fifty retail
centers in seventeen states totalling 36.8 million square
feet of retail area. Twenty-eight of the fifty centers are
in the state of California. Furthermore, the Rouse Company
owns and manages a portfolio of seventy-five retail centers
in twenty-five states totalling forty-five million square
feet of retail space. Rouse is also recognized as a
leading innovator in inner-city retail development with
major projects in the downtown areas of thirteen U.S.
cities.15
The major shareholders of Trizec trace back to the
Bronfmans (Edper), and the Reichmans (Olympia and York). A
detailed ownership breakdown is presented in Table 11.
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Table 11
Major Trizec Shareholders
EDPER HEES
INVESTMENTS 41% INTERNATIONAL
4
49 .9% 49.9%
CARENA PROPERTIES
HOLDINGS, INC.
50.01%
11%
50. 4%
TRIZEC
3.3%
70%
BRAMALEA
LIMITED
25%
ROUSE
COMPANY
Source: Interview with Harry Rannala, July 5, 1989
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Bramalea Limited
Bramalea Ltd. shares trade publicly on both the
Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges under the symbol
"BCD." "The company is a major diversified developer of
office buildings, shopping centers, hotels and industrial
properties. The firm also has significant land inventory
and home building operations in Ontario and southern
California."1 6 This factor makes Bramalea unique, since it
is the only major diversified real estate company to remain
in the residential housing sector of the market.1 7 Three
major events have occurred in the company's recent history.
These events include the sale of a controlling equity
investment to Trizec, the writedown and deconsolidation of
its major investment in the oil and gas industry, and the
purchase of Trizec's Canadian shopping center subsidiary.
Trizec's Canadian centers were combined with the company's
to form a wholly owned subsidiary named Trilea Centers
Inc." 8  In addition to Trilea Centers Inc., the company
recently acquired a 34% interest in JDS Investments Limited
(JDS). JDS is a developer of shopping centers, office and
mixed-use buildings located primarily in the Metropolitan
Toronto region.
Bramalea Ltd. entered the U.S. office development
industry in 1979 and since that time has developed 3.2
million square feet of leasable commercial space. The
company maintains a very successful home-building operation
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in Southern California and recently expanded this presence
by acquiring one of the state's largest homebuilders. The
company also owns and manages approximately 4.8 million
square feet of retail space in 11 U.S. shopping centers.
number of these centers are in smaller regional markets.
Tables 12 and 13 illustrate, first, the distribution of th
corporation's operations between Canada and the United
States, and the geographic diversity of the company's U.S.
assets by use; the source for both tables is Bramalea's
1988 annual report.
Assets
Revenue
Operating
Profit
Office
California
Colorado
Texas
Table 12
Bramalea Limited Investment Segmentation
1988 (Cdn $000)
Canada United States To
$2,411,300 $951,000 $3,36
547,100 231,200 77
227,600 62,500
tal
2,400
8,300
298,100
Table 13
Bramalea Limited U.S. Investments
Retail Residential Land
Alabama California California
Colorado Florida Florida
Florida Georgia
Maryland
Michigan
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
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A
The ownership of Bramalea Ltd. is controlled by Trizec
Corporation's 70% interest in the company. The ownership
of Trizec Corporation has been previously described in this
paper.
BCE Development Corporation
BCE Development's (BCED) shares trade publicly on both
the Toronto and the Montreal stock exchanges under the
symbol "BD." The company's activities are primarily
confined to the development and management of prime office
and retail income properties. The company also holds
substantial residential land acreage. Activities are
concentrated in major North American cities. The bulk of
its U.S. real estate assets were acquired from Daon and
Oxford Development. Its major business focus has been to
effectively deal with these assets. "Aggressive leasing
efforts, renegotiation or refinancing of prohibitively
expensive mortgates, tax-motivated financing undertaken to
monetize significant tax loss carryforwards-, asset sales,
and new project development have represented its recent
operations."1 9 Its geographic presence in the U.S. by
product type is depicted in Table 14; its source is the
company's 1987 Annual Report.
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Table 14
BCE Development U.S. Investments
Office Retail Residential Land
Colorado Illinois California California
California California Florida Idaho
Arizona Washington Washington
Minnesota Minnesota
Illinois
BCED was formerly owned in majority (67%) by Bell
Canada Enterprises. As of the date of this research,
Olympia and York Developments had recently acquired BCE's
67% controlling interest in the company. Furthermore,
Olympia and York Developments was attempting to also tender
the outstanding shares of the company for $2.80 per
share.20
Marathon Realty Company Limited
Marathon Realty is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Canadian Pacific Limited, a diversified maior Canadian
corporation. The company develops, owns and manages
income-producing properties in both Canada and the United
States. Specifically, at the end of 1987, the company's
interest in property included 12.7 million square feet of
community and neighborhood shopping centers, 11.3 million
square feet of office product, and 4.1 million square feet
of industrial, aviation-related and residential
developments.2 1 Three distinct business units operate
within Marathon. These are shopping centers; buildings
(office, industrial, aviation); and land. The ten shopping
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centers in the U.S., located in the south central United
States, total 5.5 million square feet. In this business
segment the company is in partnership with the Herring
Group. In 1987, the partnership acquired interests in six
additional centers in the South-central U.S. market
totalling 3.5 million square feet of additional retail
space. Marathon also holds considerable office and land
positions in the U.S. Table 15 identifies the markets the
company operates within the U.S., and Table 16 depicts the
company's U.S. investment in relation to its overall
investment activity. Both charts are derived from Marathon
Realty 1988 Review.
Of f ice
Calif orn
Georgia
Oregon
Assets
Revenue
Operating
Profit
Table 15
Marathon Realty U.S. Investments
Retail Industrial
ia Texas California
New Mexico Georgia
Mississippi
Arkansas
Oklahoma
Louisiana
Table 16
Marathon Investment Segmentation
1988 (Cdn. $ millions)
Canada United States
$1,174 $766
334
191
76
30
Total
$1,940
410
221
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Markborough Properties, Inc.
Markborough Properties Inc. is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the Hudson Bay Co., a diversified company
with substantial investment in the Canadian department
store industry. Markborough Properties develops, owns, and
manages office and mixed-use, retail, industrial, hotel,
~and residential product. In the United States, its real
estate activities are confined to office, mixed-use, and
land development. The company was recently reorganized
into three distinct business groups: shopping centers,
urban development, and community development. 2 2  The
company has a significant investment in eleven master-
planned communities in the United States and Canada. These
projects are in various stages of development and represent
one of the largest and most diversified portfolios of its
type in North America.
The company has an interest in 16.5 million square
feet of shopping centers, office buildings, and industrial
properties. Additionally, it holds more than 12,000 acres
of land. The extent of this investment located in the U.S.
is presented in Table 17. Table 18 presents the bulk of
this troubled U.S. investment portfolio, geographically, by
use. Both tables are based on information from Harry
Rannala, pp. 251 and 254 respectively.
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Assets
Revenue
Operating
Profit
Table 17
Markborough Investment
.Segmentation
1988 (Cdn $ millions)
Canada United States
$936 $542
173 58
104 (201)
Table 18
Markborough Properties
U.S. Investments
Office
Colorado
Nevada
Industrial
Arizona
Land
Arizona
California
Colorado
Florida
Texas
Cambridge Shopoing Centres Limited
Cambridge Shopping Centres shares trade publicly on
both the Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges under the
symbol "CBG." The company was founded through a leveraged
buyout of Oxford Development's shopping center division in
November 1980. The buyout was led by Lorne Braithwaite and
Don Priddle who currently serve as President and Executive
Vice President of the corporation respectively. Both men
were previously affiliated with Oxford Developments prior
to this purchase.2 3
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Total
$1,478
231
(97)
The company is a real estate developer with a
geographically diversified portfolio of Canadian regional
shopping centers and, to a leser extent, office and mixed-
use properties. The portfolio of fourteen million square
feet extends from Newfoundland to British Columbia. As of
the date of this research, the company did not own any
assets in the United States real estate market. However,
the company definitely intends to make a considerable
investment in the U.S. market and has been actively
pursuing U.S. retail-based investment opportunities for the
past two years. 2 4
The company is owned primarily by institutions. The
specific ownership is as follows:
CN Railroad pension fund 27%
Major institutions 45%
Management 9%
Public float 19%
100%
Source: Phone interview with Lorne Braithwaite, July 20,
1989
Cadillac Fairview Corporation Limited
Cadillac Fairview was, up until 1987, a diversified
public real estate development company possessing
substantial investments in the United States real estate
market. The major shareholders of the company were Olymp
and York (25% Reichmans), and CEMP Investments (50%
Bronfmans). "Based on the desires of the controlling
shareholders' family members to convert their substantial
investment into cash, the company was sold." 2 5
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Substantially all of the company's U.S. assets were sold in
a two-tiered transaction to JMB Realty and a syndicate of
investors arranged through Copley Real Estate Advisors.
Only twelve U.S. assets remain under the control of the new
private Canadian asset-based Cadillac Fairview.
Furthermore, James Bulloch, President of Cadillac Fairview,
stated "The twelve remaining U.S. assets the company owns
will be sold or dividended out to our major shareholder,
JMB--Cadillac now is strictly a Canadian company. Any good
U.S. deals that come my way I'll simply pass on to JMB." 2 e
The company develops, manages, and owns thirty-five
million square feet of office, mixed-use, retail, and
business park product. Finally, the ownership of the
company is as follows:
U.S. PENSION JMB REALTY MANAGEMENT
FUNDS IALTY
(major) (minor) (major) (minor)
I - -I I I
CADILLAC'S I CADILLAC'S
[_EXISTING ASSETS I NEW DEVELOPMENTS]
The previous profiles of the top ten Canadian
developers provide insight into the competitive forces in
the Canadian real estate market. Due to the tremendous
ownership concentration in relatively few hands, there
exists fierce rivalry and competition among these
"players." Each developer seeking investment opportunities
in the United States real estate market has implemented a
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variety of investment strateaies. These strateaies are
outlined in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER V
INVESTMENT STRATEGY
Overview
Up to this point, this study has concentrated on the
relative international significance of Canadian investment
in the U.S. real estate market, why and when this
investment has been made, who the major developers were
making this investment, and specifically what investments
were made where in the U.S. marketplace. Probably the most
interesting and revealing question this final chapter will
address is how these Canadian developers amassed such
substantial U.S. real estate holdings. Particularly, what
strategies were utilized, if any, in order to break into
the large and diverse U.S. real estate marketplace?
Whether these investments have been successful and what has
been learned from the Canadian's U.S. investment experience
are two other fundamental issues in this research effort.
The majority of the research for this chapter was
conducted in the form of personal interviews, with a
variety of individuals from six of the top ten Canadian
-development organizations which have significant investment
experience in the U.S. real estate market. Many of these
firms were initially reluctant to be interviewed and a
number of firms simply refused. The main reasons for this
reluctance were being too busy, having little interest in
the academic world, and having a strong desire to keep
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private how the company approached the U.S. market for
competitive advantage.
In general, a company looking to enhance its growth
potential by investing in new markets faces a number of
avenues to pursue. Simplistically, these avenues can be
segmented into the following two general categories:
1. Internal growth/development
2. Acquisition of existing assets.
It is important to note that assets being acquired are not
merely physical and tangible, but intangible as well. Very
often it is these intangible assets which possess the most
value for the investor. Good examples of intangible assets
include goodwill, reputation, historical relationships,
market knowledge, and management expertise. Much has been
written relating to the costs and benefits of these two
general approaches to investment.
Internal growth enables the investor to remain 100% in
control of his activities. All management and control
systems are established according to the existing
operation's historical operating philosophies. This
provides the expanding organization a terrific sense of
continuity. However, this strategy possesses serious
obstacles as well. The incremental nature of internal
growth can cause it to be extremely expensive. A
substantial up-front investment is required to develop the
business and long lead-times are generally involved before
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any return from the investment is realized. Finally, the
intangible aspects of investment require a lot of time and
effort to successfully establish in order to compete in any
new marketplace.
The acquisition of existing assets provides a number
of advantages when expanding an organization into new
markets. Very often "economies of scale" can be realized
if the acquisition is of assets involved in a similar
business undertaking. Additionally, "economies of scope"
are generally acquired. Economies of scope represent the
sharing of specialized know-how. Much of this know-how
relates to immediately benefitting from the intangible
asset base of the acquired entity. This factor becomes
extremely important and beneficial if this sharing benefits
both the acquiror's and the acquiree's operations.
Finally, acquisition provides an instant sense of market
presence and power--a very attractive foundation for future
growth.
This avenue of investment also includes a number of
obstacles. First of all, there may be an acute
unavailability of appropriate acquisition candidates in the
marketplace. Second, significant premiums generally must
be paid to secure control of this type of opportunity, if
available. Third, very often the pricing of the investment
is based on limited information resulting in the
purchaser's not really understanding what has been acquired
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until the transaction is completed. Very often one does
not get what one bargained for. Finally, this form of
investment has considerable transaction costs associated
with it, which are often difficult to accurately
anticipate.'
Canadian Developer Strategies
The Canadian industry will be very reluctant to
discuss U.S. investment strategy with you because
there wasn't any strategy--they just did it and are
embarrassed to talk about it.
Bernie Ghert, former President,
Cadillac Fairview Corporation
The real estate business is 100% opportunistic--there
is no such thing as a fucking strategy when it comes
to investing in real estate, whether in Canada or in
the U.S.
Benjamin Swirsky, President
Bramalea Ltd.
The above two quotations are very representative of
the overall responses received to questions about U.S. real
estate investment strategies utilized by Canadian
development organizations. Furthermore, with very few
exceptions, each company president interviewed, when asked
how and why they invested in the U.S. responded like this:
A lot of senior management spent their winters in
Florida and felt that by investing in the region, more
time could be spent in the sun.
Despite the nature of these initially general sentiments
towards investment strategy in the U.S. real estate market,
most developers interviewed went on to discuss how their
firm entered the market, and the difficulties encountered.
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They then made intelligent reflective observations which in
large part form the foundation of their current strategy
towards investing in the U.S. marketplace.
In discussing their U.S. experience, almost all of the
developers interviewed expressed common themes, particulary
as to how they view the U.S. market in general. All were
very quick to point out that, contrary to the common
sentiment that the U.S. market is one huge market
opportunity, the U.S. is actually a collection of extremely
distinct regional markets. As Donald King, President of
Marathon Realty, pointed out:
The U.S. real estate market is not one large market as
many profess it to be, instead it is a series of
regional markets, each with significant cultural and
economic differences--you should never try to be in
all markets!2
Furthermore, to most Canadian developers, the fact that
U.S. markets were technically foreign was irrelevant and
inconsequential:
The U.S. real estate market is not a foreign market.3
In my mind, the border doesn't exist, the North
American market is a set of sub-markets--if I like the-
looks of a deal, in any of these sub-markets, we go. 4
Although initially downplaying the foreign nature of
the U.S. real estate market, when probed further with
additional questions, these developers-began to reveal some
clear distinctions between investing in Canada versus the
U.S. One important distinction was the manner in which
U.S. business practices differed from those in Canada.
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A different morality exists in the U.S. real estate
marketplace. In Canada there are fifty guys who
control the business and a handshake means a deal.
Down in the U.S. much more caution is required. U.S.
companies don't lie, they just don't tell you the
truth--they don't tell you anything.5
The U.S. real estate market is much more competitive
and cut-throat than in Canada. I can't tell you how
many times I've been scooped on deals based upon
outstanding favors, relationships, and history among
U.S. real estate companies. In the U.S. a deal is
never done until it's executed in blood.6
Further distinction between the two countries' markets
included the severe overbuilding which took place in the
U.S. prior to TRA 1986, fueled by the huge syndication
business which was primarily tax-driven.
A lot of "careless capital" existed, and in part,
still exists, in the U.S. Historical REIT and Savings
and Loan policies, coupled with a former tax policy
that fueled the tax-driven syndication business,
resulted in severe overbuilding. The damage has been
done and its debris is spread out through most U.S.
major metropolitan areas. We didn't see this in
Canada at all. 7
Additionally, for reasons previously outlined in this
study, the American real estate market has become a
preferred investment vehicle for a number of foreign
buyers. As a result, this increased demand has driven
prices for product to extremely high levels. The impact of
this occurrence on Canadian developers investing in the
U.S. was strongly expressed by Neil Wood, President of
Markborough Properties:
You cannot buy existing real estate assets today in
the U.S. International competition for assets has
driven prices out of sight. You must look for
development opportunities where you can create some
value.
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In Canada, unlike the U.S., most major real estate
development companies are public companies. This fact has
important ramifications in terms of the manner in which
they approach U.S. investment. These companies are very
concerned about maintaining improved earnings and cash flow
for their wide range of owners. Although this is a short-
term strategy, it prevents any adverse movement in the
corporations' underlying common stock. However, this
mentality also prevents these companies from aggressively
entering the U.S. marketplace to facilitate growth in the
long run.
The public nature of many Canadian development
companies prevent them from being opportunistic in
their approach to investment in the U.S. There is no
such deal as the perfect deal, much like there is no
such thing as a perfect wife.8
Another long-term industry observer reinforced this
situation in stating:
Today a public company cannot buy 5% yield assets with
11% financing.9
Two final obstacles to Canadian real estate investment
in the U.S. surfaced through discussion. First, the
regional nature of the U.S. industry has resulted in U.S.
developers, within each region, establishing extremely
strong control and influence over industry participants
such as tenants, brokers, and contractors. The adverse
result of this situation was put forth by James Bulloch,
President of Cadillac Fairview Corporation:
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U.S. developers are very regional in nature with long-
standing relationships in place which makes it very
tough to break in and find a good deal. Your ability
to succeed in the U.S. is tied directly to your
ability to put experienced and connected people in
place within specific regional markets.
Secondly, in general, the U.S. marketplace is generally
much more litigious. In many markets this fact represents
an added risk associated with real estate development
compared to the Canadian market:
In the United States, after gaining approvals you've
got the court system to deal with. No matter how
inane, individual suits can hold you up and cost big
money in time--In Canada, an approval is an
approval.10
Overall, investing in the U.S. markets is not as easy
as many initial comments from large Canadian developers
suggested. Each market is very distinct within the U.S.
and in relation to Canadian markets. as Donald King,
President of Marathon Realty, observed:
Investing in the U.S. real estate market is a very
tough thing to do--a lot of Canadians including Jack
Poole (Daon) and Don Love (Oxford) experienced how
tough it can be returning to Canada with their tails
between their legs. It's not like picking cherries
off a tree! 1
Harry Rannala of McLean McCarthy Ltd. described the
U.S. market as being a "deck heavily stacked against
Canadians." In light of these difficulties and challenges,
it is interesting to examine how these Canadian developers
structured specific investments in the U.S. marketplace.
First, it should be noted that almost all of the
principals of the companies under study were reluctant to
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be interviewed. After much persistence, six companies
agreed to participate in this study but not without
requesting that certain information not be printed. Not
surprisingly, the four firms who refused outright to be
interviewed were controlled in part by the Reichman family
of Toronto. This family is extremely private in nature and
unfortunately, despite numerous attempts, were not willing
to participate in this study--nor were the executives
charged with running their various businesses. However,
wherever possible, these organizations' strategies are
documented based exclusively on public information.
The investment strategies pursued by Canadian
developers in the United States can be broken down into two
main categories. These categories are 1) internal
development and 2) the acquisition of existing assets.
Internal development involves the establishment of a
subsidiary office in the U.S. mandated to identify new
development opportunities. Acquisition of existing assets
involves three broad categories of investment. These
categories are as follows:
1. Direct purchase of a 100% interest in a completed
U.S. real estate asset, or asset under development.
2. Direct or indirect purchase, in whole or in part,
of an interest in a U.S. company involved in the real
estate development business.
3. Establishment or purchase of a partnership
relationship with a U.S. developer to pursue U.S. real
estate opportunities.
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Table 19 summarizes the major U.S. investment strategies
pursued by these Canadian development organizations.
Table 19
U.S. Investment Strategies
Internal Development
Campeau Corporation
Cadillac Fairview
Bramalea Limited
Acquisition of Existing Assets
Assets Companies Partnerships
Olympia & York Carena Devels. Cadillac Fairview
Bramalea Ltd. Campeau Corp. Marathon Realty
Marathon Realty Trizec Corp. Bramalea Ltd.
Campeau Corp. Olympia & York Markborough Props.
Trizec Corp. Cambridge S.C.s Carena Devels.
Cadillac Fairview Bramalea Ltd. Campeau Corp.
The above table is based on the deals discussed with
company officials and available public information. Two
maior observations became immediately apparent. First, the
bulk of Canadian investment in the United States has been
accomplished via the acquisition of existing assets in a
variety of forms and structures. Second, many of the firms.
have pursued a number of strateaies in the U.S. market.
The importance of this fact will be revealed later in this
paper.
Outlining a-detailed description for each company's
investments in the U.S., for each strategy, is not
appropriate for the purposes of this research. Instead.
for each strategy, a Canadian's investment which adeguately
represents the approach will be highlighted. Additionally,
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reflective analysis by a variety of executives will be
presented.
Internal Development
Between 1974 and 1982, Cadillac Fairview Corporation
undertook an aggressive internal growth strategy in a
number of U.S. markets. The company set up five regions in
the U.S. and established subsidiary offices in each. The
Canadian market was segmented into two regions. Each of
the U.S. regions were loosely defined:
Princioals of each region were left to establish the
boundaries of their respective turfs based upon the
projects they undertook.12
The principal of each region was sent down from Canada to
hunt for deals and hire additional U.S. staff as required.
Each region was given an open mandate in terms of product
type including office, retail, residential, and industrial.
Development deals were being entered into within each
region at a very fast pace. Each region reported directly
to the head office in Canada. Bernie Ghert, former
president of Cadi.llac Fairview, offered the following
sentiments:
The overall results of this strategy were disastrous.
Within each region only one product type investment
performed well--the product type which the
subsidiary's principal had experience and expertise
in--the rest were a ioke.
In 1982, the company refocused its strategy to include only
major shopping centers, office buildings, and industrial
parks. Furthermore, the company realigned responsibility
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for the entire North American market according to product
type.
Each product type requires a completely different set
of skills and relationships to successfully compete.13
Thus, the company was able to capitalize on management's
particular oroduct expertise by placing gualified
principals in charge of all markets in North America.
In the case of major mixed-use orojects, the
controlling group was the one with the maJoritv use in
the project--other groups would assist with their
respective uses on a fee basis.14
This adjusted strategy worked well for both office and
industrial projects. In the case of retail, the
competitive nature of the regional relationships in the
U.S. shopping center business required further strategy
refinement. The company needed to buy into these
relationships and did so successfully by forming a joint-
venture partnership with Peter Lebowitz.
Lebowitz had been in the U.S. shoppina center business
for a while, knew his way around, and had established
a history of contacts with a number of U.S. regional
department stores--We put up the money and gave him a
25% carried interest in U.S. projects he put
together.15
The importance of a shopping center investment strategy,
distinct from other product type strategies. will be
elaborated on further in ,this paper. "This shopping center
strategy was tremendously successful for Cadillac
Fairview."16
In support of internal growth as a strategy, Bernie
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Ghert, former President of Cadillac Fairview, made the
following observation:
With acquisitions and joint ventures, you often don't
know what you've bought. It is difficult to adapt
systems and problems always arise in management down
the road.
He further stated:
You have to look at the strengths of what you are and
strive to capitalize on those strengths. Cadillac
Fairview's strength was its ability to develop real
estate, and therefore internal growth enabled the
company to capitalize on this strength.
Further suggestions on the successful implementation of an
internal growth strategy focused on development regulation
and location. Most major U.S. metropolitan areas have been
severely overbuilt for reasons previously discussed.
Therefore, the only good markets left in the U.S. are
markets in which historically there have been severe
development regulations. By concentrating your investment
efforts on these markets (New England, California),
developers can drastically minimize adverse competition.17
Furthermore, the development of world class projects in
prime locations, within these regulated markets, is
strategically sound. Historically, these projects have
experienced the highest levels of appreciation and will
continue to do s-o based upon the ever-growing appetite of
foreing investors for this type of product.
Asset Acquisition
In 1979, Bramalea Limited decided to pursue investment
opportunities in the U.S. shopping center business. Based
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on preliminary analysis, it concluded that the development
business was too competitive since U.S. firms had each
regional market tied up. Existing relationships would make
its entry, through development, extremely difficult.19 The
company decided that the acquisition of existing assets
possessing value creation potential was the preferred
strategy. The company established what it referred to as
the "hit team." According to Ian Rankin, President of
Trilea:
This team was composed of one senior and one junior
executive mandated to go all over the U.S. to look for
deals which fit our strategy--this partnership worked
extremely well.19
Bramalea retail management had a history of effectively
dealing with "troubled oroperties." Much of its initial
Canadian portfolio had reguired substantial renovation and
remerchandizing over the years. Ian Rankin explained:
Bramalea management had a real expertise in
rejuvenating tired, old shopping centers and we felt
we could successfully translate this expertise in the
U.S. market. Besides, traditional U.S. developers
were not interested in troubled properties at the
time.
No market research was performed prior to investment. since
deals anywhere were difficult to find. The company was
determined to find an opportunity anywhere it could. Once
the "hit team" had identified an opportunity, a small group
of Canadian management were sent down to assist with due
diligence and closing.
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These individuals were known well by the corporation,
trusted employees, and shared the company's way of
thinkina.20
The pricing of these assets was based on 9 to 11%
capitalizaton rates on income in place. This pricing was
advantageous since these properties were, in many cases,
-half empty. Following closing, the "Dusting and Cleaning
Team" was put in place to undertake modest cosmetic
renovations to bring renewed life to the center and attract
new tenants.
Dusting and cleaning typically entailed new carpets,
signage, canopies, and colors. The entire program
rarely exceeded $1 million in total cost. 2 1
Once the renovation was completed, the "Task Force,"
composed of a mall manager and leasing agent, was sent down
to the mall to bring it back to life. Once substantially
leased up, the "Task Force" would move on to another
location that had been identified by the "Hit Team," and a
permanent manager would be put in place. This orocess was
repeated four times, establishing a portfolio held for
long-term investment totalling 2.5 million square feet.
Rankin further explained:
All of these deals were extremely successful
financially and some of the assets have been
additionally expanded and renovated in order to bring
the assets to current industry standards. 2 2
By 1984, however, the U.S. shopping center industry began
to recognize these opportunities as valid investments.
This increased demand for troubled assets caused prices to
increase, reflecting redevelopment potential:
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These deals were risky to start with and therefore
when prices rose, this strategy no longer worked.
There weren't any deals left.23
In order to continue to compete in the U.S. shooping center
business, Bramalea Ltd. went on to purchase a joint-venutre
interest in a partnership with a regional U.S. developer
involved in four development projects. This partnership
went on to develop twenty additional centers in the U.S.
Reflecting back on Bramalea's experience in the U.S.
retail market, Ian Rankin made the following observations:
Strategies of Canadian firms are in large part a
function of the skills and personalities of each
individual company. There must be some synergy or
experience to bring to bear based on the parent
company's strengths . . .
You must look for opportunistic deals in the U.S.
which unfortunately now are next to impossible to find
based on current irrational pricing levels. Buy
auality and take a longer-term view to build asset
value . .
It has taken Bramalea ten years to establish a retail
presence in the United States. Establishng presence
on your own is a very difficult thing to do.
Olympia and York Development's acquisition of eight
Manhattan office buildings (the Uris Package) in 1977 is
another strong example of the opportunistic investment
approach required to successfully follow an asset
acquisition strategy. These buildings were purchased at a
time when New York City's economic future appeared dismal.
Real estate investors from all over the world looked at
this package and decided to pass on it based on New York's
bleak financial condition.
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The deal would soon look shrewd. In another couple of
years it would look brilliant. In four years it would
be called "the deal of the century," ranking in real
estate mythology right up there with the Louisiana
Purchase. It would be recounted in real estate
circles in the same hushed tones that Peter Minuit's
original purchase of Manhattan Island for U.S. $24 was
told to wide-eyed schoolchildren. 2 4
An additional, more current asset acquisition strategy
was put forth by Bernie Ghert, former President of Cadillac
Fairview Corporation:
Real estate assets owned by the troubled savings and
loan institutions, particularly in Dallas and Austin,
Texas, are available at 50%-80% of replacement cost
and are of very high quality despite vacancies. The
acquisition of these assets is an excellent strategy
to pursue but it holds uinque problems for Canadian
investors. To gain access to these deals you must
become integrated into the local business community.
For Canadians, distance represents a real problem.
Additionally, the sale of a foreclosed S&L asset
forces the institution to book a loss on the loan at
today's market value. Thus, many S&Ls are waiting for
markets to improve causing the number of available
deals to be limited. However, deals are being done,
but it's extremely tough to capitalize on them as a
Canadian developer.
Corporate Acquisition
In January of 1986, Campeau Corporation began
investigating corporate acquisition opportunities in the
United States. This strategy in large part was a result of
Robert Campeau's dissatisfaction with the outlook for the
Canadian economy and political policies in general.
Additionally, the much more free-enterprise American
economy, growth forecasts, and international liquidity for
assets were all strong motivators of this strategy. Prior
to 1986, the company had made a number of real estate
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investments in the U.S. in the form of internal
development, asset acquisition, and partnerships: "In
aqqreqate the company achieved limited success." 2 5
The company's founder and one other vice president
spent the first half of 1986 evaluating potential target
companies in the U.S. to acquire. Many of these targets
were analyzed and put forward for consideration by a
prominent New York-based investment bank. The target was
not limited to real estate companies and in fact a number
of industries were considered. However, an industry with
some synergistic relationship with real estate development
was perceived as strategically optimal. This process led
to the eventual focus on the American retailing industry.
At the time, the industry was beginning to consolidate, a
number of companies were widely held, and professional
management, geared towards short-term financial results,
had kept their balance sheets essentially clean--relatively
little long-term debt was in place. Additionally, despite
the fact that the company viewed a retail investment alone
as the fundamental premise, significant synergy was also
anticipated by combining the company's real estate
expertise with acquired retailing assets. By mid-year the
company identified Allied Stores Corporation (Allied) as
their investment target. Allied not only possessed over
twenty regional department and specialty store divisions,
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but also owned five major U.S. shopping centers and much of
the real estate on which its store locations existed.
Over time, Campeau acquired a 4% interest in the
company quietly on the open market, while it continued to
analyze Allied's operations based upon public information.
Consultants were brought on board the acquisition team as
required, all of them being U.S.-based companies with
considerable expertise in the merger and acquisition
industry. Once relatively comfortable with its evaluation
of Allied, Campeau approached the chairman of Allied in
September, expressing an interest in purchasing its five
regional shopping centers. Relevant information was
supplied to Campeau management and a quick evaluation of
these assets was undertaken. The resultant offer made for
the centers was harshly rejected and, overall, Allied was
not taking the Canadian company's efforts too seriously.
The result was that in October 1986 Campeau launched a
hostile takeover bid for the entire company and
successfully closed the U.S. $3.6 billion transaction on
December 31, 1986. Much of 1987 was spent restructuring
the company. Bank, junk, and mortgage refinancing of
acquisition debt was put in place and eighteen department
and specialty store divisions were sold to reduce
borrowings associated with the acquisition. The "new"
Allied was composed of four strong regional department
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store divisions, managed by a completely renewed executive
team.
The acquisition was considered a huge success by
virtue of its common shares doubling in value. On April 1,
1988, Campeau completed a similar U.S. $6.6 billion
acquisition of Federated Department Stores, a much larger
U.S. retailer, and has undertaken similar restructuring.
The residual operations and management of the two retailing
companies have subsequently been combined to create one of
the largest department store retailers in North America.
It is too early to comment on the long-term success of
this overall strategy, even though remarkable progress has
been made. The company has established a formidable
presence within the regional retail real estate business
and has already embarked upon a number of projects,
utilizing its retail franchises, through its new wholly-
owned subsidiary Campeau Development Corporation in the
U.S. The transaction costs and default risk of this type
of strategy are formidable.
Another example of a corporate acquisition strategy
involved Trizec Corporation's entrance into the U.S. retail
real estate market. In November 1980 Trizec purchased the
Hahn Company of San Diego, California and later in 1981
purchased a 20.5% interest in the Rouse Company of
Columbia, Maryland. Trizec's interest in Rouse has been
subsequently increased to 25%. Both these corporate
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acquisitions provided Trizec with instant presence and
market power and despite initial difficulty, both have been
quite successful.26 Once again, the price premium,
management, and financing risks associated with this
strategy are significant.
Partnerships
In the mid-eighties, Marathon Realty decided to
investigate an investment in the U.S. shopping center
industry to assist in the company's future growth. The
company chose to pursue a partnership strategy with a local
U.S. developer because it recognized the importance of
buying an introduction, skills, management, and time. 2 7
Donald King, president of the company, made the following
observation:
Shopping center investment is an investment in a
business versus office or industrial which are
primarily project investments. To succeed in the U.S.
shopping center industry you must acquire the
relationships and regional knowledge to compete.
All markets were potential candidates for the company's
U.S. entry. Following considerable effort, the company
identified a Dall.as-based firm called the Herring Company
-which had an existing operation in the Southern United
States. The opportunity emerged based on adverse economic
conditions within the company's operating regions. "In
short, the Herring Company needed cash." A Master
Partnership was entered into in which Marathon purchased a
70% interest in existing malls and development sites.
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Donald King explains, "It was a marriage of convenience." 28
The agreement also stipulated that Marathon reserved the
right to acquire the balance of the partnership at the end
of five years. Marathon deliberately chose to limit its
initial investment to 70% in order to "get into the local
fabric" and maintain existing management continuity. Day
to day operation of the Herring Marathon Group was left to
Mr. Herring and his team. However, Marathon was given
board representation and approvals over major investment
decisions. To date this partnership controls interests in
six million square feet of retail space. 2 9
In 1988, Marathon purchased the remaining 30% interest
in the Partnership. The main reason for the accelerated
buyout was "a desire expressed by Mr. Herring for personal
tax reasons." A few senior Herring executives left the
business, including Mr. Herring himself. In Mr. King's
opinion,
We accomplished our objective in terms of buying into
the market and view the effect of our increased
control as a booster taking off into orbit.
In reflecting on this strategy of entry into the U.S.
market, Donald King made the following observation:
I view our investment as successful despite the
continued sluggishness of the southern U.S. economy.
It is very important to carefully outline and define
your dreams with your partners. Stick to your
knitting where you do it well--stay regional in the
U.S. . . .
It's better to have U.S. citizens managing your U.S.
operations to avoid the "green card syndrome." Many
of the Canadians sent down to manage U.S. projects
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after receivinq their areen card, were picked up by
other U.S. development companies--the card in itself
holds a lot of power for Canadians.
Both Bramalea Ltd. and Markborouqh Properties have
utilized joint-venture partnership strategies in the U.S.
as well. As alluded to previously, Bramalea Ltd. entered
into a joint-venture with a U.S. "middle market" developer
named Ainbinder. 3 0 This company had strong relationships
in place with K-Mart and J.C. Penney in midwestern markets
and was looking for a money partner to expand further.
Ainbinder's business specialized in "middle market" centers
ranging from 150,000 to 200,000 square feet. Bramalea
purchased a partnership interest in four development
projects. This partnership went on to develop twenty
shopping center proiects. 3 1
Overall the results were terrible--most of the
projects went into the around at 10% interest rates
and out of the ground at 20%.32
Ainbinder vanished from the deal, leavina Bramalea to take
on all the Partnership's liabilities. The assets were
subsequently packaged and sold as a syndication, prior to
TRA 1986 in the U.S. Ian Rankin. President of Trilea
Centers, made the following observations:
It took a lot of hard work and time to get out from
under this deal and the company certainly did not
recoup its initial investment. In hindsight, all we
really bought was an entree into nickel and dime
towns--we probably should have looked for a developer
involved in larger projects in major U.S. metropolitan
areas.
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Markborough Properties has invested in a number of joint
venture partnerships in the United States. In all cases
management problems have resulted in the company buying out
its partners' interests. Neil Wood, President of
Markborough Properties, had the following insicht into U.S.
investment and joint-venture partnerships:
To be successful in the U.S., you must do your
homework, buy or acauire local knowledge, understand
the market, competition, and demand. Most importantly
you must put good manaqement in place--there is no
substitute.
In the long run, partnerships never work out. If they
do they work by aood luck rather than good manacrement.
Employee status with incentive compensation is the
most effective means of managing real estate
investment relationships in the U.S.
One final partnership strateqy was suqested by many
of the developers interviewed. This strategy entailed
alignincg the Canadian developer with a U.S. life company or
pension fund. However, despite some attempts, this is
extremely difficult to do. With a huge stock of successful
U.S. developers, within each regional market, there is very
little rationale for these institutions to select a
Canadian company.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
International investment in America's real estate
market has increased considerably over the past ten years.
This heightened investment activity has caused excessively
high pricing levels and growing concern by Americans over
foreign investment in aeneral. Although less than 1% of
all America's real estate is foreign-owned, foreign
ownership of product located in major U.S. metropolitan
areas is much higher.
Canada ranks among the top five world nations
controlling investments in U.S. assets, including real
estate. The Japanese have recently been the most
agaressive foreign investors in U.S. real estate. However.
Canadians have been investing significant capital into the
U.S. market for the past fifteen years. This level of
investment has been largely unseen since, in many ways.
Canada is not perceived as foreign in relation to other
world investors. Canada's cultural and linguistic
foundations are similar to those of the U.S., it is
perceived as a friendly neighbor. and no recent history of
aggression between the two countries exists. Canada has
never represented an economic threat to the U.S. in any
form.
Despite the current overbuilt nature of many American
real estate markets, Canadians will continue to seek real
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estate investment opportunities in U.S. markets. The
relative size of the American market, economic performance,
political policies, and international liquidity for its
assets will continue to draw Canadians south of their
border. Canadians were uniquely drawn to the U.S. real
estate market for the following fundamental reasons. The
limited size of the Canadian market forced companies to
establish a national presence, thereby developing skill at
operating development subsidiaries from a distance. This
fact, combined with limited growth potential domestically,
resulted in their entry into U.S. real estate markets.
Furthermore, the entrepreneurial backgrounds of Canadian
developers, coupled with a banking system more than willing
to lend funds based on corporate credit versus specific
assets, fueled Canadian investment in U.S. real estate
markets. Non-business forces, such as the love of a
challenge and the ability to spend more time in southern
U.S. climates, were also apparent.
A number of major differences exist between the two
countries' real estate environments. First of all, the
ownership of the Canadian development industry is
tremendously concentrated in very few hands, compared to
the wide-ranging regional ownership pattern in the U.S. In
Canada, if companies are not owned in part by the Reichman
or Bronfman families, then in many cases institutional
ownership is in place, which tends to take a more short-
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term view towards real estate investing. Additionally,
Canada is a relatively homogeneous marketplace, while the
U.S. market is made up of a great number of economic and
culturally distinct regional markets. Throughout these
distinct markets a much more questionable business and
ethical morality exists which makes adapting initially very
uncomfortable for Canadians. Furthermore, the
international demand for U.S. real estate assets, combined
with a tax policy, prior to 1986, has resulted in severely
overbuilt major metropolitan cities and very high and
irrational pricing levels compared to those in Canada.
Finally, in the U.S. there is a much more litigious civil
environment, which can cause real problems for Canadian
developers. However, on the whole, a much less regulated
development process is encountered in the U.S., with a few
exceptions in specific geographic locations such as
California and Massachusetts.
The Canadian developers as a group are very
entrepreneurial and have developed extremely creative and
opportunistic investment strategies as a result of intense
competition within the limited Canadian market. Their focus
in the U.S. has included various product types primarily
within major U.S. metropolitan areas experiencing strong
growth levels. Many have also concentrated on cities
possessing intensive real estate development regulation in
order to minimize adverse competition. Of the ten large
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companies profiled in this study, the vast majority
currently have at least 30% of their total asset base in
the U.S. However, levels of investment segmentation are as
high as 90% in some instances.
Throughout this research effort, almost all of
Canada's leading developers were reluctant to share
information and experience. This fact in itself offered
further validation of the very private and controlled
nature of the Canadian industry. The industry itself is
not at all academically oriented and is concerned over
sharing its various approaches to U.S. investment for fear
of sacrificing each company's respective competitive
advantage. Much of what was revealed through interviews
was restricted from publication.
This research identified four main investment
strategies pursued by Canadian companies in the U.S. real
estate market. Specifically, these were internal
growth/development, asset acquisition, corporate
acquisition, and partnership. Almost all of the companies
highlighted had, in the past, utilized two or more of these
investment strategies. The fundamental conclusion from
this extensive U.S. investment experience was that to be
successful as a Canadian company investing in the U.S., the
strategy pursued must capitalize on the existing skills,
expertise, and strengths of the investor. Those
developers which have been successful in the U.S. have all
91
recognized this concept and accordingly adopted an
appropriate investment strategy.
A strategy of internal growth/development in the U.S.
has been successful in the past and will continue as a
preferred strategy of develooment companies whose true
strength is in developing real estate, as opposed to
financial deal-making. Trusted management possessing
specialized expertise within one real estate product type
must be utilized. Each product type demands a completely
different set of skills and therefore management of U.S.
real estate assets should be segmented by product type
rather than geographic location. Finally, this strategy
has rarely been successful for Canadians in the U.S.
shopping center business. The regional nature of the
business and historic relationships among U.S. developers
and retailers, make this strategic approach unwarranted.
Therefore its adoption should be limited to office.
industrial, and residential investment by Canadian
companies possessing development ability as a fundamental
strength.
Historically, an asset acquisition strategy has been
successful in capitalizing on unigue market opportunities
in the U.S. In some cases tremendous value has been
created very guickly. However, based upon the high current
and forecasted levels of international demand for U.S. real
estate product causing prices to be extremely high, this
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strategy possesses limited opportunity going forward. In
today's U.S. market, these unique asset acquisition
opportunities are pretty well non-existent. However, one
should always be on the lookout for these unique market
situations as a secondary investment strategy in the U.S.
Finally, as with internal growth/development, this strategy
is less appropriate for shopping center product since, in
general, by simply purchasing assets one does not acquire
the required relationships and management expertise to
successfully compete in the U.S.
Strong evidence exists in support of a corporate
acquisition strategy to successfully enter the U.S. real
estate market. Trizec Corporation in particular has
demonstrated this strategy's appropriateness for their
financial deal-making orientation. This strategy has been
successfully utilized to gain access to the U.S. shopping
center business, since it provides an opportunity to
purchase long-term experienced management and associated
relationships. Once again, the success of this strategy in
large part depends on a Canadian company's experience and
ability to operate in the high-risk U.S. merger and
acquisitions environment. In the future, this strategy
will continue to be utilized by Canadians, particularly
those seeking U.S. shopping center investments.
The final investment strategy identified through this
research was the establishment or purchase of a partnership
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interest with an established U.S. real estate developer.
The research suggests that historically this strategy is
destined to fail in the long term. Management of this type
of relationship in the long run is a "nightmare."
Conflicting vision, systems, and investment criteria
between U.S. and Canadian partners are extremely difficult
to manage successfully. However, in the short term, this
strategy represents a very effective means of entering U.S.
regional markets, establishing a presence, and benefitting
from established relationships. Provision to buy out the
U.S. partnership interest within five years is recommended
in order to secure control of the investment in the long
term. This strategy is also attractive for U.S. shopping
center investments and will continue to be utilized by
Canadian developers in the future.
In aggregate, a Canadian company seeking investment
opportunities in the U.S. real estate market must be
opportunisitic in its approach and never expect to uncover
the "perfect deal." This type of investment is very
difficult to manage successfully and should be made with a
view to build long-term asset-value. If the physical
development of real estate product is a Canadian company's
main strengh, then an internal growth/development strategy
for office, industrial, and residential product should be
pursued. Put trusted, experienced individuals in place and
provide them with eguity participation. Despite the
94
internal strenqth of a Canadian development company, U.S.
shoppinq center investment should be pursued through either
corporate acquisition or the creation of a short-term
partnership with a credible U.S. developer with an
obiective to secure control in the lonq term.
As a final note, the author believes that Canadians
will continue to acgressivelv pursue U.S. real estate
investment opportunities in the future. The North American
real estate market will increasingly represent one large
and diverse opportunity. Canadian developers who strive to
develop this mentality and skill will among the industry
leaders of tomorrow.
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